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Abstract. In recent years, curial incidents and accidents have been reported due 
to unintended control caused by misjudgment of statistical machine learning 
(SML), which include deep learning. The international functional safety stand-
ards for Electric/Electronic/Programmable (E/E/P) systems have been widely 
spread to improve safety. However, most of them do not recommended to use 
SML in safety critical systems so far. In practical the new concepts and methods 
are urgently required to enable SML to be safely used in safety critical systems.  
In this paper, we organize five kinds of technical safety concepts (TSCs) for 
SML components toward accordance with functional safety standards. We dis-
cuss not only quantitative evaluation criteria, but also development process based 
on XAI (eXplainable Artificial Intelligence) and Automotive SPICE to improve 
explainability and reliability in development phase. Finally, we briefly compare 
the TSCs in cost and difficulty, and expect to encourage further discussion in 
many communities and domain. 
Keywords: Safety design concept, Statistical machine learning, Functional 
safety 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, AI technology has been widely used to improve performance and/or 
efficiency of functionality in safety-critical systems, and realizes automation with many 
input data in complex situations. The safety critical services including automated driv-
ing are drastically changing as well. For autonomous driving systems, AI technology 
especially SML is employed in safety critical functions. However, many cases that lead 
to crucial accidents due to unintended control caused by SML misjudgment have been 
reported [1]. In general, SML systems are implemented as an E/E/P system. The inter-
national functional safety standards for E/E/P systems have been widely used in various 
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domains. IEC 61508 [2] for general, ISO 26262 [3] for automobiles and ISO 13849 [4] 
for control systems are typical. Unfortunately, safety of E/E/P systems using SML are 
not completely argued in the standards at this time, and then dangerous incidents and 
accidents regarding the unintended behaviors of SML systems occurred in practical 
situations. Therefore, new safety concepts and methods for SML systems are urgently 
required in many industries. 
In TIGARS project [5], we have widely studied gaps between development of con-
ventional deductive systems and one of SML systems especially for autonomous vehi-
cles. In SEAMS project [6], we have researched safety argumentation and measures 
for safety-related SML systems. We have also developed typical design concepts and 
learning processes of SML to comply with functional safety standards, and finally 
published the guideline document as The safety design guidelines for SML systems, 
which is currently in Japanese only. Based on our guideline, in this paper, we discuss 
TSCs for safety-related SML systems toward accordance with functional safety stand-
ards, and compare them in cost and difficulty for practical developments. We also as-
sume that HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment), specification of safety 
goals, which are top-level safety requirements (SRs), and assignment of SRs to the 
target SML system have already been finished, then discuss how the SRs can be 
achieved in concept, design, implementation and verification phases, which corre-
spond to typical V-model shown in IEC 61508 and ISO 26262. The one of the popu-
larly-implemented safety measures for functional safety is an additional safety moni-
toring function for safety related components. Then, the SML component can be 
treated under QM (Quality Management). In addition to the mechanism, we also pro-
pose TSCs, where no additional mechanism is required, and consider quantitative cri-
teria applicable for SML components with SIL (Safety Integrity Level)/ASIL (Auto-
motive SIL). 
The contributions of this paper are as follows. 
- We analyze gaps and make technical issues clearer for SML components toward 
accordance with functional safety standards. 
- We present TSCs to mitigate or solve the technical issues. 
- We propose safety measures to ensure both reliable behaviors and reliable devel-
opment process for safety-related SML components. 
- We briefly compare the proposed TSCs in cost and difficulty for practicality. 
2 Related research 
Current functional safety standards do not recommend the use of AI including SML, 
but several documents have been published to consider safety of AI. Table A.2 of IEC 
61508-3:2010 and Annex G of SOTIF standard [7] present an off-line training process 
for SML, but these documents do not mention specific criteria or safety design policies. 
European Commission [8][9] describes management measures for SML. However, 
these documents do not mention any concrete safety design for functional safety. Many 
studies have examined safety designs for safety-related SML systems such as autono-
mous driving. Mobileye's approach [10] is to set rules that prevent the automated driv-
ing system from producing accidental output. DeepMind [11][12] proposed a method 
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for repeating reinforcement learning to ensure that SML systems output only in safety 
range. However, neither mentions functional safety standards. As described above, 
there are currently no technical documents that specify concrete requirements for 
safety-related SML systems to comply with functional safety standards. 
Mentor’s White Paper [13] shows architectural design for safety-related SML systems 
and expects that the safety criteria will be introduced in the newest version of [7], which 
is considered as preprocess of functional safety activities. However, it does not mention 
concrete design and evaluation of SML software component. Rick [14] shows technical 
problems for AI to comply with ISO 26262, but did not mention specific measures to 
solve them. Leading companies for autonomous driving in Germany, the United States, 
and China published Safety First for Automated Driving [15] for dependability includ-
ing both of safety and security. This document is under working in ISO TC 22 to be 
published as TR4804. In Chap. 6 of the document, issues, expected work products, and 
activities in learning are considered for the development process of safety-critical com-
ponents using supervised DNN (Deep Neural Network). However, no clear correspond-
ence with the functional safety standards and no quantitative evaluation criteria is de-
scribed. 
In ELISA project [16], functional safety-compliant measures for Linux kernel, which 
is one of the popular and complex software platforms, have been discussed. The quality 
of such complex and deductive software can be theoretically assured with the white box 
approach required in functional safety standards. However, it is difficult to take same 
approach for SML systems because of its inductive behavior. The technical issues are 
explained in the next section. 
In recent years, highly explanatory software development based on Automotive 
SPICE [17] has become popular in the automotive industry for sufficient reduction of 
risks on development and accountability for development process quality. The new 
standards such as ISO 25119 [18] for agricultural machinery and ISO 19014 [19] for 
construction machinery have been also published. However, it is difficult to show that 
the risk is sufficiently reduced since the learning process of SML is not included in such 
standards. Patrick [20][21] proposes workflows and guidelines for AI development. 
However, it did not clarify the details of each process and not sufficiently explained 
about risk reduction measures required in functional safety standards. 
3 Proposed technical safety concepts 
3.1 Technical issues 
SML is typically established as neural network form, and predicts inductively after 
recursive learning of its model. AI including SML is not now recommended to be used 
for fault correction due to its dynamic reconfiguration according to Table A.2 of IEC 
61508-3:2010. For more details, we believe that followings especially regarding SML 
systems are not allowed or strongly prohibited in the current functional safety stand-
ards. 
- SRs including probabilistic behaviors 
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- Design and implementation with explicit probability of fails to meet SRs 
- Recursive learning as dynamic reconfiguration 
Since deductive systems work as designed, the behaviors of them can be verified and 
be reliable through reliable development process based on practical standards or guide-
line. On the other hand, inductive systems like SML systems are developed through 
recursive learning using finite training dataset. Supervised SML outputs prediction re-
sults, which may be probabilistically calculated on its neural network. Unsupervised 
SML outputs a probabilistic distribution or a decision result based on that. Therefore, 
outputs from SML can be wrong even if its design and implementation are completely 
performed through reliable process. According to this essential reason, we believe that 
development of SML cannot directly meet requirements in functional standards, and 
then new safety concepts for SML systems are necessary. 
We assume that prediction algorithms for SML is implemented in software through 
functional safety development process. A typical software development process like V-
model in functional safety standards consists of two kinds of activities. One is to ensure 
reliability of software behaviors (outputs), and another one is to ensure quality of reli-
able process, where design, implementation, verification and validation based on SRs 
assigned to the component are included. We analyzed gaps between development pro-
cess for conventional deductive software components and one for SML software com-
ponents. In Table 1, technical issues for key activities in software development process 
are described. We believe that most of them are similarly applicable to hardware com-
ponent development. 
Table 1. Key activities and technical issues for SML software development 
Key activities  Characteristics of SML Technical issues  
[P-a] SR speci-
fication 
The prediction result (output) dif-
fers possibly depending on input 
and external environment. If the 
prediction employs stochastic 
logics, the determinism of the be-
havior becomes quite low. 
It is difficult to clearly specify require-
ments including preconditions, inputs 
and outputs. The test specifications ex-
tracted from SRs cannot comprehen-
sively specified. Then, it is difficult to 
ensure sufficient quality of the output. 
[P-b] Con-
sistency check-
ing between re-
quirements and 
implementa-
tions 
In general, to understand the inter-
nal structure and parameters of 
SML is quite difficult for engi-
neers. Then, keeping consistency 
among requirements, design and 
implementation of SML is quite 
difficult as well. 
It is quite hard to investigate the root 
cause of the incorrect output. The impact 
analysis of retraining of the model cannot 
be done with fine grain. This means that 
whole of the SML system must be revali-
dated after any retraining. 
[P-c] White-
box verifica-
tion 
Same as the above. 
The exhaustive white-box test and review 
are difficult in unit and integration verifi-
cation phase. If such phases are skipped, 
it is suspicious whether sufficient quality 
is ensured only by system integration test 
and validation. 
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[P-d] Quality 
management 
process 
The learning methods for SML are 
currently diverse and flexible.  
No standardized process to mitigate or 
avoid high risk during learning and re-
learning phases. 
3.2 Technical safety concepts for safety-related SML systems 
To solve technical issues for SML, we propose the five types of TSCs shown in Table 
2. For each concept, we describe relevant documents and qualities to be assured for the 
target SML system or software component. More details are described in the following 
sections.  
Table 2. TSCs for safety related SML software components 
3.3 (1-1) Safety monitoring mechanism 
Explanation: As an additional safety mechanism, a monitoring system is introduced to 
mitigate or avoid dangerous situation outside the SML software component. When any 
malfunctions happen at the component, the safety mechanism detects dangerous situa-
tion, and then stops the software or output a safe value as priori to ensure safety of 
whole of the system. This is one of the most popular safety measures for functional 
TSCs Relevant documents 
Safety 
assur-
ance in 
system 
level 
Safety assurance in soft-
ware component level 
Reliable 
process 
Reliable 
output 
(1) Safety 
design for 
safety-re-
lated SML 
Systems 
(1-1) Safety moni-
toring mechanism 
Sec.7.4 of IEC 61508-
2:2010, Sec.6 of ISO 
26262-4:2018, 
Sec.6.2.5 Cat.2 of ISO 
13849-1:2015 
X N/A N/A 
(1-2) Redundant 
SML software 
components 
Figure B.2 of ISO 
26262-5:2018 N/A N/A X 
(2) func-
tional 
safety ca-
pable de-
velopment 
process 
for safety-
related 
SML soft-
ware com-
ponent 
(2-1) Assessment 
of SML develop-
ment process 
Sec.7.4.2.12 and 
Sec.7.4.2.13 of IEC 
61508-3:2010, 
Sec.6.4.12 of ISO 
26262-2:2018  
N/A X N/A 
(2-2) Quantitative 
evaluation of dan-
gerous failure rate  
Sec.5 of IEC TS 
62998-1:2019  N/A N/A X 
(2-3) Proven in 
use 
Sec.7.4.2.12 of IEC 
61508-3:2010, Sec.14 
of ISO 26262-8:2018, 
Table 7 of ISO 13849-
1:2015 
N/A X X 
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safety. To detect abnormal and dangerous situation, just as examples, output of SML 
component or feedback from actuator should be checked. 
Requirements for functional safety standards: The sufficient independence must be 
established between the SML component and the safety monitoring mechanism accord-
ing to Sec.7.4.2.3 of IEC 61508-2:2010. Both of common cause failures and cascading 
failures between them are comprehensively analyzed by system FMEA (Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis), and fundamental causes are removed. Then, the SML component 
can be treat as non-safety related one, and the safety mechanism should be developed 
with SIL/ASIL assigned to the SML component originally. 
3.4 (1-2) Redundant SML software components 
Explanation: Two or more redundant components of the SML software component are 
additionally introduced to reduce probability of fails to meet SRs. This concept is based 
on safe fault, which is defined in ISO 26262-1:2018 and explained in Figure B.2 of ISO 
26262-5:2018. In ISO 26262, safe fault is explained as one of failure mode classifica-
tions of a hardware element. The three or more multiple faults that occurs independently 
are considered as a safe fault, and no safety measures are required for them. No quan-
titative criteria like failure rate of parts is mentioned. We believe that it is possible that 
unintended output of three or more redundant SML software components can be con-
sidered as a safe fault if these components work independently and probability of fails 
to meet SRs is not highly increased. 
Requirements for functional safety standards: For liable output, three or more re-
dundant components of the SML component are differently designed and allocated to 
sufficiently independent elements. Each component should work as self-contained one 
with safety mechanisms, which detect faults, errors, or failures regarding itself, and 
transit to safe state and stop its output to avoid any interference to other components. 
We believe that function-level or design-level diversity is required. For functional-level 
diversity, each component uses different kinds of inputs and have intended functional-
ities for the component. For design-level diversity called N-version design, each com-
ponent employs different SML model, learning data and be trained by different devel-
opment team. 
For liable design, functional-level or design-level diversity contributes to obviously 
decrease systematic failures as well. However, as the best of our knowledge, no con-
cepts or methods is introduced to reduce SIL/ASIL assigned to the SML component 
after HARA phase except for ASIL decomposition in ISO 26262-9:2018. Therefore, 
safety measures for systematic failures in each redundant component may be required 
based on SIL/ASIL originally assigned to the SML component. (2-1) can be addition-
ally considered as safety measures. While unintended output from SML is considered 
as a result due to performance limitations in [7], in this concept, it is considered like 
component failure. 
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3.5 (2-1) Assessment of SML development process 
The technical issues of SML are listed in Table 1. To solve these issues towards ac-
cordance with functional safety standards, we discuss whether the XAI techniques can 
be utilized in Sec.3.5.1. The XAI named by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) in the United States is one of modern research topics, and aims to 
explain clearly prediction results and internal of AI models. We propose an explaina-
ble learning process of SML based on Automotive SPICE in Sec.3.5.2. 
Table 3. Capability of XAI techniques for key activities  
XAI techniques [P-a] [P-b] [P-c] [P-d] 
LIME N N P N 
CORELS P P P N 
Prototype Selection P P N N 
MMD-critic P P N N 
Explainable SML learning process (Sec.3.5.2) N N N F 
3.5.1 Realization of functional safety process using XAI technology 
Explanation: In recent years, the XAI techniques have been proposed and introduced 
in [22]. In Table 3, we focus on several methods to explain internal of AI models or 
test them, and briefly evaluate them in capability for each key activity, where F, P and 
N means fully capable, partially capable and non-capable, respectively. LIME [23] 
explains concretely how outputs from AI components are generated under specific 
conditions. We believe that white-box tests of SML can be partially performed using 
LIME, however, exhaustive test is difficult because of incredible number of condi-
tions and situations in general. CORELS [24] searches solutions quickly in combinato-
rial optimization problems by learning the rule list based on the decision tree, where 
requirement specifications of SML are clearly described. We believe that [P-a] can be 
performed by utilizing the rule list if requirements are described as similar optimiza-
tion problems. While it is difficult to obtain exhaustive traceability among require-
ments, designs and implementations in SML development, highly reliable tools may 
be able to support keeping consistency between the rule list and the model of SML 
component. Unfortunately, such tools do not exist at this time. For classification prob-
lem with supervised learning, Prototype Selection [25] finds training data that repre-
sents each category. MMD-critic [26] is also helpful to output of SML by presenting 
both typical and atypical examples for each category. However, it is difficult to vali-
date outputs and weight values in SML.  
Requirements for functional safety standards: As shown in Table 3, no complete 
method, which can be capable for all key activities, is proposed. However, combining 
several XAI techniques may be able to perform partially these activities. The one of 
critical problems is lack of exhaustive testability because the traditional test methods 
based on equivalence classes and boundary value analysis cannot be applied to SML. 
This means that [P-a] is a fundamental issue in SML. Just one possibility, we think that 
the rule list from the CORELS can be used as preliminary requirement specifications 
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and then equivalence classes and boundary value analysis are also performed. If LIME 
is also combined, [P-a], [P-b] and [P-c] may be able to be performed better. The devel-
opment of reliable support tools for these issues are necessary. More detail study re-
garding this topic is a future work. For [P-d], we believe that explainable SML learning 
process is required while XAI can be partially helpful for [P-a], [P-b] and [P-c]. 
3.5.2 Explainable SML learning process 
Explanation: We propose an explainable SML learning process based on Automotive 
SPICE, which is the de-fact standard in automotive software engineering, to mitigate 
risks introduced in SML learning process. We tailored the major practices of Automo-
tive SPICE and considered adequate activities for each practice. In Table 4, the part of 
our proposal is shown. 
Requirements for functional safety standards: We recommend the developers and 
engineers of the SML component to record all evidence for each practice, and to explain 
that all practices have been properly performed based on the proposed process to inde-
pendent authorities. 
Table 4. Example of tailoring Automotive SPICE to the SML learning process (Excerpt) 
3.6 (2-2) Quantitative evaluation of dangerous failure rate 
Explanation: We propose a quantitative evaluation method for SML software compo-
nent based on IEC TS 62998-1:2019 [27], which is for safety-critical sensor systems 
Automotive SPICE Version 3.1  
Base Practices Tailoring results of SML learning process 
SWE.2.BP1: Develop software 
architectural design. 
The design documents for SML architecture are created 
to clearly define the technical policies like number of 
layers, type of optimizer type of learning data etc. 
SWE.2.BP2: Allocate software 
requirements. 
If the SML component is split into multiple elements, 
the requirements for the component are explicitly as-
signed to the elements. 
SWE.2.BP3: Define interfaces of 
software elements. 
If the SML component is split into multiple elements, 
the interfaces among them are clearly defined. 
SWE.2.BP4: Describe dynamic 
behavior. The dynamic behavior and resources consumption of 
the SML component are clearly defined and explained. SWE.2.BP5: Define resource con-
sumption objectives. 
SWE.2.BP6: Evaluate alternative 
software architectures. The design policy is evaluated.  
SWE.2.BP7: Establish bidirec-
tional traceability. 
For the SML component, traceability between require-
ments specification and architecture design is docu-
mented to ensure their consistency. SWE.2.BP8: Ensure consistency. 
SWE.2.BP9: Communicate 
agreed software architectural de-
sign. 
The architecture design for the SML component is dis-
cussed and agreed by developers and engineers when 
the design is changed.  
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and describes a quantitative criteria of dangerous failure rates for each SIL. In [27], the 
probability of dangerous output from the sensor systems is calculated based on the 
probabilistic distribution of the sensor’s output, and reduction of probability for dan-
gerous output is required according to SIL assigned to the sensor system. Similar to 
variation of sensor’s output under diverse environment, the SML component also de-
pends on environment and non-deterministically behaves. Therefore, we believe that 
the quantitative criteria can be utilized for SML component. An example of applying 
the evaluation method in [27] to a distance measurement using SML is shown in Fig. 
1.  
 
Fig. 1. Application of IEC TS 62998-1 to SML 
Requirements for functional safety standards: The evaluation formula for accepta-
ble probability of the SML component is presented as (1). The right of (1) depicts meas-
urement probability, where L is the upper limit PFH (average frequency of dangerous 
failure per hour), and D is operation request rate. P	 > 1 −	 !" (1) 
In case that distribution of outputs, which are distance values to the object in this ex-
ample, is on the normal distribution, P in (1) is the safety allowable range. Based on the 
SIL assigned to the component, the target performance to be achieved becomes clear 
since the performance class is defined for each SIL in Table 1 of [27]. For example, 
SIL 3 corresponds to the performance class E, and therefore, the minimum required 
performance is 1-2.5×10-8 obtained from Table 5. The safe output range is set as σ of 
the normal distribution, where σ means the acceptable error range of the SML outputs. 
When σ is set to a wider value and then P also increases, it is more difficult to achieve 
the required performance to the SML component. This method is greatly helpful to 
evaluate performance of SML components.  
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Table 5. The quantitative evaluation criteria from Table 5 of [27] 
Performance class A B C D E F 
The right side of (1) >1-2.4×10-3 >1-1.0×10-5 >1-3.0×10-6 >1-2.5×10-7 >1-2.5×10-8 >1-2.5×10-9 
3.7 (2-3) Proven in use 
Explanation: In fact, the concept of proven in use has been accepted in many safety 
standards. Due to the story, we believe that prove in use is acceptable to utilize SML 
components in safety critical domains.  
Requirements for functional safety standards: The acceptable conditions in proven 
in use is strictly defined. The binary of software and chip product of microprocessor 
should be completely same, and the history record of a long-term usage, for example 
one year or longer in IEC 61508, is required as well. In C.2.10.1 of IEC 61508-7:2010 
and Sec.14 of ISO 26262-8:2018, the quantitative criteria are defined, such as period 
of use, failure rate, number of operations, etc. In practical, acceptable conditions ex-
plained above can prevent SML components from rapidly improving by retraining of 
the model and introducing new hardware chips or techniques for SML. 
4 Discussion  
In Table 6, we briefly compared the TSCs explained in this paper, and evaluated 
them in both of cost and difficulty. The value of 0 (no or nothing), 1 (few or easy), 2 
(conventional or normal) or 3 (significant or difficult) is roughly assigned as relative 
evaluation to each result. In the Total row, total evaluation score for each concept is 
presented, where lower is better. (1-1) is most applicable in practical development, 
however it requires additional monitoring systems, which can increase hardware 
costs. In (1-2), since the failure rate of each hardware element in safety critical sys-
tems is assumed to be quite low the idea of safe fault can be acceptable. In case of 
SML components, it is a technical problem whether failure (i.e. false positive/nega-
tive prediction) rate can be decrease similar to hardware elements in practical. As de-
scribed in Sec.3.5, (2-1) is currently difficult to fully comply with functional safety 
standards. If that is achievable in practice, future benefits increase. In (2-2), we intro-
duced a well-established evaluation formula. In practice, balancing between perfor-
mance requirements and safety allowable range should be considered more detailed. 
As another issue, because [27] is not a popular technical specification at this time, its 
applicability for SML systems should also be discussed in each industry. (2-3) is the 
cheapest and easiest, however requires long-term usage and have strict conditions, 
which can cause a crucial disadvantage in practical system as explained in Sec.0. 
Through the discussion here, we believe that (2-1) and (2-2) are attractive and practi-
cal concepts to reduce development costs in many industries. 
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Table 6. Brief comparisons for TSCs  
TSCs Phase 
Workloads in 
newly devel-
opment 
Hardware 
cost 
Realization 
difficulty 
Workloads 
after re-
learning 
To-
tal 
(1-1) system archi-tecture design 
almost same 
as conven-
tional deduc-
tive systems 
(2) 
additional 
monitoring 
system re-
quired (3) 
same as 
conven-
tional de-
ductive sys-
tems (1) 
reintegra-
tion test (1)  7 
(1-2) system archi-tecture design 
three or more 
redundancy 
with sufficient 
independence 
required (3) 
three or more 
redundancy 
with sufficient 
independence 
required (3) 
diverse de-
sign (3) 
component 
test and re-
integration 
test (2) 
11 
(2-1) 
development 
and change 
management 
of SML com-
ponent 
almost same 
as conven-
tional deduc-
tive systems 
(2) 
no additional 
hardware re-
quired (0) 
more im-
provements 
in XAI tech-
niques ex-
pected (3) 
reassess-
ment of the 
relearning 
process (2) 
7 
(2-2) 
development 
and change 
management 
of SML com-
ponent 
output meas-
urement and 
quantitative 
evaluation re-
quired (1) 
no additional 
hardware re-
quired (0) 
lack of ex-
perience (2)  
remeasure-
ment of out-
put and re-
assessment 
(2) 
5 
(2-3) 
one or more 
year(s) after 
product re-
lease 
data recording 
and its evalua-
tion (1) 
no additional 
hardware re-
quired (0) 
easy but us-
age condi-
tion is re-
stricted (1) 
relearning 
is not al-
lowed (3) 
5 
5 Conclusion 
We presented five kinds of TSCs for SML components toward accordance with 
functional safety standards. We also discussed not only quantitative evaluation crite-
ria, but also development process to improve their explainability and reliability in de-
velopment phase. Through the discussion above, we concluded that combination of 
XAI techniques and quantitative evaluation method based on [27] can partially solve 
technical issues and are practical concepts to reduce development costs at this time. 
However, further researches and discussions are necessary to completely solve the is-
sues mentioned in this paper. We will continuously study the topics and update our 
guideline to encourage further discussion in many communities and industries. 
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